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Abstract Seven human factors models were evaluated using a small number of historical 
transfusion error reports to explore learning from human and organisation factors and decide the 
best model for a planned larger retrospective study. Insufficient information given in many 
reports led to subjectivity in categorisation, but the conclusion was that systems engineering 
initiative for patient safety 2.0 may be the best single system to use. Analysing the human 
factors effectively in transfusion incidents could provide some insights into process 
improvement.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 1996, transfusion errors and reactions in any healthcare organisation in the United 
Kingdom (UK) have been reportable to the UK haemovigilance scheme, Serious Hazards of 
Transfusion (SHOT) www.shotuk.org. However, the incident reporting questionnaires do not 
specifically include any examination of the human factors (HF) and systems problems that might 
contribute to an error. There has been very little HF research in transfusion, so a retrospective 
analysis of previously reported transfusion errors would highlight the system failings leading to 
errors and facilitate recommendations for safety improvements within the transfusion process.  
 
The objective for this study was to elucidate which HF method(s) is/are the most effective to 
analyse historical transfusion error reports in order to gain the maximum learning from these 
incidents. Most HF methods are not designed for healthcare systems and have traditionally been 
used for examining incidents in high reliability organisations (HRO) such as aviation and the 
nuclear industry. Although these industries involve complex sociotechnical systems, they do not 
have the variability associated with healthcare.  
 
2. Methods 
 
A limited dataset of historical transfusion error reports (n=76) from calendar year 2014 was 
analysed using seven different HF models for incident investigation. These reports had already 
been fully analysed by SHOT’s traditional techniques and published in the 2014 Annual SHOT 
Report (Bolton - Maggs, 2015). Therefore, the dataset was known to be validated and suitable for 
further research. The HF models and methods that were used are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Brief description of the sub-categories of HF models and how each characteristic 
was interpreted 
 
HF models and application of each characteristic 
SRK – Skills, Rules, Knowledge (Rasmussen, 1983) 
Skills - Operators performing role with little conscious control. 
Rules - Limited by regulations or standard operating procedures (SOP), low levels of knowledge 
Knowledge - Application of knowledge and experience to complex tasks or changeable circumstances. 
Active & Latent – Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1990) 
Slips - Skill-based slip - action not carried out as planned 
Lapses - Skill-based lapse, such as omission 
Mistakes - Rule or knowledge-based error. Faulty plan or intention, i.e. did something believing to be 
correct 
Violations - Acted against SOP or regulations 
Latent - Managerial, organisational and high level failures 
AcciMap – Accident Mapping system (Rasmussen, 1997) 
Government - Department of Health (DH) level 
Regulatory - Transfusion regulators and guideline publishers 
Company - Trust management 
Operational - Departmental management 
Staff – People, including staff and patients 
Equipment & surroundings - Local equipment and direct environment 
HFACS – Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (Shappell et al.,1997) 
Unsafe acts (UA) - Level 1 - errors and violations 
Preconditions for UA - Level 2 - Environment, personal (medical, tired, not capable etc) personnel 
(communication) 
Unsafe supervision - Level 3 - training, leadership, known problem, supervisory 
Organisational - Level 4 - HR, budget, equipment/facility, climate, operational 
STAMP – Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling and Processes (Leveson, 2004) 
Enforcement constraints - Control actions = unidentified hazard, lack of control of known hazard, 
process doesn't enforce control 
Execution of control action - Communication, inadequate actuator e.g. IT component that 
moves/controls system 
Missing feedback - Inadequate or missing feedback in system 
FRAM – Functional Resonance Analysis Method (Hollnagel et al., 2004) 
Input - Start of process 
Output - Result of what the function does e.g. by processing the input 
Resource - Something needed or consumed while a function is carried out 
Controls - e.g. SOP, guidelines etc. 
Precondition - Function cannot begin before preconditions established.  
Time - Temporal relationships, e.g. order of doing things, or if done in parallel 
SEIPS 2.0 – Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety 2.0 (Holden et al., 2013) 
Person(s) - Both patients and healthcare professionals 
Tasks - Specific actions within larger work processes. 
Tools & Technology - Objects that people use to do work or that assist in doing work. 
Organisation - External control of time, space, resources, activity etc. - i.e. management 
Internal environment - Physical e.g. light, noise, vibration, temperature, physical layout, available 
space, air quality  
External environment - High-level societal, economic, ecological, policy = factors outside an 
organisation 
 
The rationale for choice of incidents to be studied was: 
1. Errors that led to an incorrect blood component transfusion (IBCT) which is the most 
dangerous of errors made in the transfusion process and can lead to patient death. Laboratory 
based IBCT errors (n=36) were analysed, because my professional background and 
experience would facilitate a more accurate HF analysis from the scientific information given. 
2. A similar number of near miss errors (n=40) were analysed as a comparison for the IBCT 
incidents. Near misses are defined by the error being discovered before the transfusion of a 
blood component actually took place. It was expected that as these errors were detected before 
any harm came to the patient, there might be better descriptions of how the error happened 
and what led to the discovery of the incident. It is anticipated that transfusion near miss errors 
will potentially be a source of information on Safety-II aspects, which can be compared to the 
current systems of transfusion error reporting that reflect a Safety-I culture (Hollnagel, 2014). 
 
3. Results 
 
Table 2 shows a breakdown of which errors were subcategorised including those where the 
details provided were not sufficient to make a categorisation at all, n=26/76 (34.2%). 
 
Table 2: Summary of outcome of subcategorisation of error incidents 
 
 IBCT Near miss Total 
Errors subcategorised 27 23 50 
Errors not assessable 9 17 26 
Overall total 36 40 76 
 
Figures 1 to 7 show the results of the subcategorisation of n=50 transfusion error reports using 
seven different human factors models.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Transfusion incidents categorised by SRK 
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Figure 2: Transfusion incidents categorised by Active/Latent (Swiss cheese model) 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Transfusion incidents categorised by AcciMap 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Transfusion incidents categorised by HFACS 
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Figure 5: Transfusion incidents categorised by STAMP 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Transfusion incidents categorised by (FRAM) 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Transfusion incidents categorised by SEIPS 2.0 
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Each HF model was ranked against a set of criteria and the outcome of that ranking is given in 
Table 3. This uses a simple scoring system of ticks for HF models that meet the criteria and 
crosses for those that do not meet the criteria. 
 
Table 3: Ranking of HF models against pre-determined criteria designed to select the most 
useful method for classification 
Scoring system: 0 - does not meet the criteria; 1 - barely meets the criteria; 2 - partially meets the 
criteria; 3 - fully meets the criteria. 
 
 Human Factors Models 
(abbreviations are expanded in Figures) 
Criteria to rank HF models 
for study 1 
SRK Active 
& latent 
Acci 
Map 
HFACS STAMP FRAM SEIPS 
Simple to use with minimum 
training 
2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Has a clear scope for analysis 3 3 2 3 3 0 3 
Consistent classification 
between different types of 
incident 
0 0 0 3 2 0 3 
Focuses on patient safety 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Searches for and reveals 
underlying causes 
0 0 2 3 2 3 3 
Provides a description of the 
incident 
0 0 2 2 2 0 2 
Contributes to understanding 
of corrective and preventative 
actions (CAPA) 
0 0 2 2 0 0 2 
Can classify multiple errors 
occurring in a single incident 
0 0 2 2 2 2 2 
Helps in generating 
recommendations 
0 0 2 3 2 0 3 
Is valid and reliable to 
provide a clear outcome 
(insufficient data to rank) 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Total 5 5 12 18 13 5 21 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The results of the subcategorisation exercise show some inconsistencies and in particular some 
subcategories have a large number, whereas others have none. This can often be explained by the 
nature of the work done in the transfusion process, e.g. in the SRK subcategorisation there are no 
cases categorised as skills. This is likely to be because staff undertaking tasks within the 
transfusion process would be working at higher levels and will not usually be defined as 
‘operators performing a role with little conscious control’. 
 
HF models that consider external factors in depth, e.g. AcciMap, HFACS and SEIPS 2.0, should 
be useful in helping to get to the underlying causes of an error and from there should contribute 
to further understanding of corrective and preventative actions (CAPA). However, during this 
analysis of historical error cases there was often insufficient information given to expose the full 
impact of external factors. Those who report transfusion incidents have a tendency to put blame 
onto individual staff members, but don’t expand on possible underlying reasons for this, such as 
lack of training or shortage of suitable staff; e.g. it is common for non-transfusion personnel to be 
asked to work in transfusion laboratories, especially in out-of-hours and on call situations. 
Largely the reporters don't give specific reasons contributing to the error, such as if the individual 
was interrupted, tired, overworked etc. The report submitted to SHOT will simply indicate that 
the individual deviated from the standard operating procedure (SOP), which meant in this HF 
categorisation exercise there were a number of cases that had to be categorised as individual 
error, when that may not have been the whole story. Therefore, a disproportionate number of 
cases were categorised as ‘violations’ (Active/Latent), ‘staff’ (AcciMap), ‘unsafe acts’ (HFACS) 
or ‘persons’ (SEIPS 2.0). The finding that quite a high percentage could not be classified raises 
the issue of whether this approach is ideal. Since future analyses are planned, more work is 
needed to examine whether this bias will be significant in a larger sample, because satisfying 
SHOT requirements for incident reporting are quite different from the information needed for an 
accurate human factors analysis. 
 
During the research it was noted that the incident reports for IBCT incidents generally had more 
HF-related information than the near miss reports, which was opposite to the expectation prior to 
analysis. The reasons for this are probably two-fold: 
• The questionnaires for IBCT are much longer than those for near misses and they ask a lot 
of supplementary questions to help get a full picture of the incident. Although they do not 
specifically ask for HF information, it seems that the larger amount of general information 
can help with HF categorisation. 
• IBCT incidents are the most serious errors, so the local incident investigators will want to 
try and understand the incident as fully as possible in order to prevent recurrences. This 
may lead to more information being available for further investigation. 
 
There were some limitations of the research, such as the analysis against several HF models, 
meant it was only possible to subcategorise the cases using one category in each model. Complex 
systems can lead to multifaceted errors, so more than one aspect of a model may be needed to 
describe the error fully. 
 
Another limitation was that insufficient information was available in many reports so that 34.2% 
of cases were not classifiable. It was frustrating that a number of these cases indicated a root 
cause analysis (RCA) was available, but that document was then not attached to the incident 
report. Therefore, a further development might be to amend the reporting database to require an 
upload if the question about an RCA is answered positively. 
 
Several of the more complicated HF models did not lend themselves to being used in this simple 
overview analysis and some, such as AcciMap, HFACS and FRAM may be far better suited to a 
prospective analysis of the end to end transfusion process. 
 
All the HF models in this study produced constructive subcategorisations, but none of them 
proved to be an outstanding method. From the ranking process (Table 3) it appears that SEIPS 
2.0 would be the most appropriate method for use in further research. A set of criteria were used 
for this ranking to selectin selecting a single method to take forward for a further research project, 
but this was necessarily a subjective not objective process. It was refined by using a scoring 
system to rank from 0, does not meet the criteria to 3, fully meets the criteria, but it could be 
argued the top score for the SEIPS 2.0 method was only achieved by a disproportionate score for 
the criterion ‘focuses on patient safety’. Adding a weighting to some criteria might improve the 
disctinction between HF models, but it is currently difficult to weight the criteria on a small 
sample. Therefore, it This could have been refined by adding weighting to some of the different 
criteria and also by using a more in-depth scoring system, such as: 0 - does not meet the criteria; 
1 - barely meets the criteria; 2 - partially meets the criteria; 3 - fully meets the criteria. 
 
All the HF models in this study produced constructive subcategorisations, but none of them 
proved to be an outstanding method. From the ranking process (Table 3) it appears that SEIPS 
2.0 would be the most appropriate method for use in further research, but it might be useful to 
examine another limited number of historical cases in more depth using a combination of the the 
SEIPS 2.0 method and some of the other higher scoring methods to decide which in more depth 
to decide if this model produces sufficient valuable information when used alone. 
 
In conclusion, this research asked “Can we learn about human and organisation factors from past 
transfusion errors?”. The question isn’t fully answered yet, because the models being studied did 
not give a definitive answer, but the work has enabled the list of HF models to be narrowed 
down. This will inform a second study looking at incidents in more depth using a limited set of 
models. 
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